



ORCID of the Journal: <https://orcid.org/0009-0000-0723-9485>

DOI Number of the Paper: <https://zenodo.org/records/13933618>

Edition Link: [Journal of Academic Research for Humanities JARH, 4\(3\) July-Sep 2024](#)

Link of the Paper: <https://jar.bwo-researches.com/index.php/jarh/article/view/449>

HJRS Link: [Journal of Academic Research for Humanities JARH \(HEC-Recognized for 2023-2024\)](#)

CHOOSING THE TRACK: PAK-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 1947-77

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Paper Information

Citation of the paper:

(JARH) Faiz. M. A., Akhtar. M, N., and Akbar, B., (2024). Choosing the Track: PAK-US Strategic Partnership 1947-77. In *Journal of Academic Research for Humanities*, 4(3),296–306.

QR Code for the Paper:



Subject Areas for JARH:

- 1 Social Sciences
- 2 History and Political Sciences

Timeline of the Paper at JARH:

Received on: 30-04-2024.
 Reviews Completed on: 04-09-2024.
 Accepted on: 14-9-2024.
 Online on: 30-9-2024.

License:



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Recognized for BWO-R:



Published by BWO Researches INTL.:



DOI Image of the paper:



Abstract

The Cold War, an ideological conflict between two superpowers of the World—i.e. US and USSR, was going on when Pakistan emerged on the globe in 1947. Pakistan's creation took place on the religiously ideological rationale of the Two Nations Theory in South Asia. Besides asserting its national recognition among the international community, it had to confront myriad challenges concerning its security. Despite striving to maintain its nonaligned posture towards the Cold War, soon it had to fall into the Western bloc led by the USA against the Soviet bloc led by the USSR. This paper unravels the political, strategic, and economic dynamics of the international environment and the constraints of the newly-born state of Pakistan while striving for its survival and interplaying with the international arena between 1947 and 1977. This study recounts the interests of regional and international players in South Asia, Pakistan’s internal political milieu and external threats making its survival hard, and its strategic manoeuvring to cope with the confronted challenges. It evaluates the constraints leading Pakistan to be a strategic partner of the USA and goes into a cast and benefit analysis of this partnership. This study argues that the complex arrangement of international and regional politics and Pakistan's internal economic and political instability compelled it to join and stay in the Western bloc, making it hard to quit it despite losing its trust in its strategic partnership with the US. The methodology deployed in this discourse is descriptive, normative, and qualitative and analysed chronologically.

Keywords: USA, Pakistan, Diplomacy, Economy, Strategic.

Introduction

At the end of World War II in 1945, the world witnessed a new world order, so to say Cold War, a term used to explain ideological conflict and antagonism between two superpowers: USA and USSR. The former was leading dominantly a block of Western European countries adhering to the liberal and capitalist economy and the latter, its allies endorsing Marxist ideology and socialist economy. In the presence of this World Order, Pakistan emerged as a country having its roots in Islamic ideology in the wake of a separatist movement of Indian Muslims. They considered themselves a distinct nation in the subcontinent having a different religion-cultural orientation than that of the counterpart Hindu community, which was numerically superseding them in a new political, democratic setup introduced by the British Raj. The situation further worsened when Pakistan confronted the dispute over demarcation of boundaries, distribution of assets, rights on rivers and princely states like Kashmir with India. Compelled by security challenges and the fragility of the economy, Pakistan searched for economic aid and strategic partnership and signed a military pact with the USA in the early 1950s, hoping that the USA would aid against the threat of Indian aggression. Nonetheless, Pakistan was disappointed while defending itself from India in the Wars of 1965 and 1971. Consequently, Pakistan under the Premiership of Bhutto adopted a foreign policy of distancing from the USA terming it bilateralism. Yet, Pakistan again fell into USA security networking when the Soviet Union attacked Afghanistan in 1979, perceiving itself as the next target of Soviet invasion. However, this paper provides an analysis of US-Pakistan relations from 1947 to 1977.

Significance of the Research

This study sheds light on the variables that influenced the strategic alliance between the US and Pakistan during their early years, offering insights into the evolution of such

relations. The study explains how interactions between the US and Pakistan affect security and stability in the region, especially in South Asia and the larger Cold War setting. It provides insights into the diplomatic tactics both nations used during a pivotal time of global realignment, potentially having implications for ongoing international relations. This study adds to the body of knowledge on diplomacy, international relations, and strategic alliances by serving as a foundation for more in-depth research and analysis.

Research Objectives

1. To explore and examine the internal and external political dynamics of Pakistan compelling it to search for an alliance with a superpower such as the USA.
2. To evaluate the pros and cons for Pakistan to enter a strategic partnership with the USA.
3. To analyze the Cold War era regional milieu and Pakistan's foreign policy standing towards the USSR, China, and India.

Research Questions

1. What were the internal and external challenges confronted by Pakistan, that led it to search for some strategic partner like the USA?
2. How far US-Pakistan strategic partnership remained successful, considering its cost-benefit analysis?
3. How did Pakistan interplay with regional and international players like the USSR, China, and India, while maintaining its strategic relations with the USA?

Research Methodology

The methodology employed in this study is descriptive-cum-analytical, making a normative analysis of the qualitative and archival data.

Literature Review

Nascent Phase of U.S.- Pakistan Relations (1947-1953)

One of the fundamental ideas of international relations theory is the establishment of diplomatic relations between states. Numerous aspects, including geographic

location, historical antecedents, political dynamics, economic imperatives, and ideological orientations, require close examination throughout this deliberative process. As such, any academic study of Pakistan must include a thorough analysis of the nation's foreign policy as well as a questioning of its historical and geographic foundations. Such an investigation enables a comprehensive understanding of the contextual factors influencing Pakistan's decisions on its foreign policy and its strategic orientations. The establishment of the US-Pakistan relationship corresponded with Pakistan's birth. The US administration, particularly President Harry Truman and his advisor George C. Marshall, enthusiastically greeted Pakistan's entry into the international arena. Additionally, the United States facilitated Pakistan's aspirations for United Nations affiliation, underscoring its commitment to supporting Pakistan's international standing. Pakistan, in turn, articulated a sincere aspiration to foster fraternal ties with fellow Muslim nations while endeavoring to navigate clear of entanglement in major power conflicts. In the immediate aftermath of its formation, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan affirmed Pakistan's non-alignment stance, pledging to abstain from aligning with any ideological camp amidst global tensions. Governor General Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who articulated Pakistan's foreign policy doctrine as one rooted in amicability and benevolence towards all nations, also reiterated this sentiment. Half a year later, Jinnah confirmed, "Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards all nations of the world." [Burke, S. M. \(1973\)](#). In its nascent phase, Pakistan encountered a myriad of challenges. Stemming from the Muslim League's assertion for the amalgamation of Muslim-majority provinces to establish a new sovereign entity, Pakistan, the focal regions of consideration comprised Sind, Baluchistan, Punjab, Kashmir, and Assam. Pakistan's quest

for both financial and military assistance unfolded against the backdrop of complex geopolitical dynamics. However, the prospect of engagement with Russia was constrained by electoral considerations. In diplomatic spheres, Pakistan's leadership exhibited a steadfast commitment to Islam and democratic values, which stood in contrast to the socialist ideology espoused by Russia. This ideological dissonance, compounded by perceptions of Russian indifference towards Pakistan and India, underscored the complexities of bilateral relations. [Maqbool, A. B.](#), The United States emerged as a key potential ally for Pakistan, particularly in the aftermath of World War II. With its status as the wealthiest nation globally, contributing to over 40% of worldwide production, the U.S. held significant promise for support. Moreover, the shared democratic principles between the two nations offered a favorable alignment of ideals. Consequently, American attention towards South Asian nations, including Pakistan, was somewhat peripheral. [\(Robert J. McMahan\)](#), Following Pakistan's creation, the United States of America maintained an accommodating and cordial relationship with the newly established country. On August 14, 1947, the day of Pakistan's independence, President Truman sent a sincere note to that country wishing for success via close U.S.-Pakistan relations and American support. One prominent example of this devotion was when U.S. Department of State official Phillips Talbot travelled to Karachi, the country's capital, in August on a diplomatic trip. Shortly thereafter, President Truman responded empathetically to statements made by Pakistani diplomat Isfahan regarding the need for economic development, modernization, and social progress in Pakistan. On August 14, 1947, Pakistan's Independence Day, President Truman delivered an emotional statement reaffirming the US commitment to aiding the new Dominion in its onward motion. These feelings were reinforced when Phillips Talbot, a senior official from a well-known U.S.

government department, visited Pakistan in August. Approximately one month later, President Truman responded sympathetically to Ambassador Isfahan's statement regarding Pakistan's need to stabilize its economy, modernize its infrastructure, and enhance healthcare, education, and living standards. Pakistani officials requested \$2 billion in military and economic aid from the United States to alleviate the current situation. Though courteous, the reaction was a polite decline considering the US attention on recent events in China, Europe, and the Middle East. Alternatively, the US donated a meager \$10 million from its war relief budget. This decision was made evident on March 11, 1948, reflecting the United States' cautious approach to the regional conflict. The United States reevaluated its Asian policy in response to this development. The Joint Chiefs of Staff committee emphasized Pakistan's strategic importance on March 4, 1949, which prompted a reexamination of US foreign policy objectives in the area. He thus wrote, "Most of the South Asia had little value to the US except the countries in the vicinity of the USSR [Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan might be required as a base for air operation against central USSR and as a staging area for forces engaged in the defense or recapture of Middle East oil areas." (Abdul Sattar, 2015). Defense experts in the U.S. began to recognize the strategic importance of Pakistan's geographical location in March 1949. The U.S Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged the significance of the Karachi and Lahore regions as vital bases for air operations vis-à-vis the USSR, and as manufacturing hubs for military equipment, ensuring security for the Middle East's oil-producing areas. They emphasized Pakistan's position as the principal Islamic country with vital strategic significance in the Middle East, given its proximity to the USSR and the oil-rich fields of the Persian Gulf. At a convention of U.S. diplomats in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in February 1951, significant attention was drawn

to Pakistan's role in ensuring the security of Middle Eastern states. Subsequently, in April 1951, U.S. and U.K. officials concluded that Pakistan's involvement might indeed be the decisive factor in securing the region. Initially, the U.S. extended overtures to India, viewing it as more significant than Pakistan due to its large size and population. (Sattar, 2007), India encouraged the Afghan government to engage in activities aimed at destabilizing the newly formed state of Pakistan to weaken it. India's opposition to Pakistan escalated to the extent that it was the only country to vote against Pakistan's membership in the United Nations Organization (UNO). In the situation of membership of UNO, Pakistan also faced problems created by India and the British Government. United Kingdom was one of the major members of UNO and a permanent member of the Security Council as well. However, Pakistan, as a newly formed state, viewed itself distinctively from India, which perceived itself as the continuation of British India. Pakistan, submitting a separate application for new membership among 54 members, received support from fifty-three countries, except for Afghanistan, its sole dissenting neighbor. (Rafiq, 2007), Pakistan since its inception encountered numerous challenges. Security emerged as a paramount concern, as its leaders believed that inadequate security posed a threat to its survival. Another significant issue in formulating its Foreign Policy was the imperative to bolster its economy. Inimical attitude of India and preservation of Integrity.

1. Search for peace and security.
2. The unity of the Muslim world.
3. To Maintain Non-Allied State
4. Supporting the Freedom Movement
5. Follow the UNO charter
6. Bilateral relations with neighboring countries
7. Search the fields of the economic and social progress of the country

8. To keep Balance in the relations with major powers

Based on the fundamental principles, we examine the foreign policy systematically, regime by regime. U.S. President Truman announced his Four Point Program aimed at aiding newly established states in their development. In February 1951, under the Point Four Package, the U.S. allocated financial aid of \$600,000 to Pakistan. Vice-President Richard Nixon of the United States visited Pakistan in December 1953. In comfortable discussions he promised, "In the years to come the U.S will be proud to stand with Pakistan in industrial development and also in defense against any danger." ([Dawn,, 1953](#)), Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who lived for only one year following the birth of Pakistan, established numerous foundational institutions and articulated enduring principles guiding foreign relations. Quaid-e-Azam demonstrated a keen interest in fostering global harmony and advancing the development and prosperity of humanity. M A Jinnah during his speech stated: There lies in front of first-hand part, and it will challenge to produce as well as retain goodwill and friendship with the United Kingdom and our, complaisant region Indian beside with further sister, state so we all organized to make our ultimate role for the peace in the world. ([Muhammad Ali Jinnah , as Governer General, 1947-48](#)) The vision of Quaid-e-Azam M.A. Jinnah for the nascent state was that of a liberal, modern Muslim nation committed to democratic principles. He sought to strengthen ties with other democratic nations to uphold this vision. Quaid-e-Azam paid tribute to the United States as a "beacon of light," recognizing its support for states striving for freedom from international rule. Quaid said, "Our object should be peace we want to live peacefully and maintain cordial and friendly relations with our immediate neighbors and with the world at large, we stand by the UNO Charter and will gladly make our full contribution to peace and prosperity of the

world." ([11 March, 1948](#)), In its early years, Pakistan encountered challenges amidst the ideological rivalry between the United States and the USSR. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan delineated Pakistan's resolute position, underscoring its dedication to pursuing its interests independently in the international arena. Furthermore, there was a concerted emphasis on a collective approach and collaborative measures to address other contentious disputes, such as those concerning Palestine, the Suez Canal, Kashmir, and Iran's oil. Despite the global divide between the Communist and Capitalist blocs, Pakistan refrained from fully aligning with either, though it leaned towards fostering friendship with the United States over Russia. Relations with Britain experienced some strain due to Pakistan's refusal to accede to Britain's financial demands, a stance aimed at safeguarding Pakistan's economic independence. A pivotal moment in Pakistan's history occurred with the official visit of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan to the United States in 1950. ([Ahmad, 1988](#)) Liaquat Ali Khan shed light on the founding principles of Pakistan, stemming from the United States' limited understanding of the Muslim League's governance. During his address to the House of Representatives, he elucidated the Islamic economic system as a potent solution for addressing economic disparity.

1. Freedom to live following the principles of Islam.

2. Economic progress: ([Mahmood](#))

During his visit to the US, Liaquat Ali Khan also sought to address Pakistan's defense needs and ensure the security of his country by briefing the US Defense Secretary on its defense requirements. ([Embassy of Pakistan, Washington DC, Pakistan](#)), Following Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination, Khawaja Nazmudin assumed leadership in the House, while Malik Ghulam Muhammad assumed the role of Governor General of Pakistan. Khawaja Nizamuddin, a close associate of Quaid-e-

Azam, upheld a dignified demeanor and was known for his integrity. Despite formally supporting Iran in its oil dispute, he was reluctant to take a confrontational stance, which posed challenges in maintaining friendly relations with Iran. On the other hand, Malik Ghulam Muhammad, who had originally run for prime minister, was keen to make use of the authority that Quaid-e-Azam had previously had as Pakistan's governor-general. A confrontation between the Governor-General and the Prime Minister resulted from this disagreement. The dismissal followed in the morning on April 17. Following the dismissal of Khawaja Nazmudin, Governor General Malik Ghulam Muhammad appointed Muhammad Ali Bogra as the next Prime Minister of the country. Upon concluding his tenure as Prime Minister, Bogra resumed his role as ambassador to the United States.

Diplomatic Maneuvering: U.S.-Pakistan Defense and Strategic Ties in the 1950s

Before Ghulam Muhammad visited the U.S., Ayyub Khan met with Dulles on September 30, 1953, to discuss military aid. ([Briefing Memorandum for President , Nov. 11,1953](#)) During this meeting, Dulles assured Khan about arms aid. Ghulam Muhammad visited the U.S. on November 12, 1953, and met with Dulles, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, and Eisenhower to discuss arms aid. However, Ghulam Muhammad's visit sparked an uproar in India, prompting Nehru to warn Washington and Karachi about the potential consequences if vast armies were built up in Pakistan with the aid of the U.S. ([Sarvepalli, Jawaharlal Nehru: Autobiography , 1978](#)) Taking notice of Nehru's statement Eisenhower sent a perspective note to Dulles about the problem in dealing with India and Pakistan on November 16, 1953." President wrote. "This is an area of the world where, even more than most cars, emotion rather than reason seems to dictate Policy. I know you will be watchful to see that we would not create antagonism unnecessarily." ([Eisenhower note to Dulles , Nov. 16,1953](#)) In

the realm of Cold War diplomacy, pivotal discussions between Pakistan and the United States unfolded in the early 1950s, culminating in high-level meetings between Pakistani and American officials. Before Ghulam Muhammad visited the U.S., Ayyub Khan met with Dulles on September 30, 1953, to discuss military aid. During this meeting, Dulles assured Khan about arms aid. Ghulam Muhammad visited the U.S. on November 12, 1953, and met with Dulles, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, and Eisenhower to discuss arms aid. However, Ghulam Muhammad's visit sparked an uproar in India, prompting Nehru to warn Washington and Karachi about the potential consequences if vast armies were built up in Pakistan with the aid of the U.S. ([Text of Bogra Statement in UK High Commission, 26 Feb , 1954](#)) After returning to Washington, Nixon favored Pakistan for providing military aid. He said to the NSC briefing "Pakistan is a country I would like to do everything for it. It will be disastrous if Pakistan would not go through." ([Memorandum of Conversation between vice President Nixon, Governor Gen. Ghulam Muhammad FRUS , 1952-1954](#)), Amidst evolving geopolitical dynamics in the early months of 1954, Pakistan embarked on a strategic move to secure military assistance from the United States. Following diplomatic exchanges between the two nations, Washington signaled its approval of Pakistan's request for military aid, leading to a formal application by Karachi in February. Pakistan sought to address its arms requirements through diplomatic channels with the United States. Initially, an American army team surveyed Pakistan, proposing a modest aid package of \$30 million. However, amidst uncertainties surrounding the aid allocation until late 1954, a high-powered Pakistani delegation, comprising Muhammad Ali Bogra, Ayub, and Ch. Muhammad Ali undertook a crucial visit to Washington. Expressing dissatisfaction with the proposed aid amount, Prime Minister Bogra emphasized the

importance of a more substantial commitment from the United States. Under this landmark agreement, the United States pledged to provide Pakistan with essential defense materials, enabling the nation to bolster its internal security and actively contribute to regional stability. In the geopolitical landscape of the Cold War, Pakistan strategically positioned itself in alignment with the anti-communist ideology espoused by the Western Bloc, which provided a rationale for its pursuit of significant financial assistance. This alignment was further reinforced through the signing of defense agreements and membership in Western-led alliances like CENTO and SEATO. This ideological polarization underscored Pakistan's evolving diplomatic landscape during the Cold War era. (Rashmi, November 8, 1954) When the time Bogra met Eisenhower financial help was raised to \$ 109 million. In 1954, Pakistan signed a defense agreement with America. In 1954, Pakistan was becoming a member of the CENTO and SEATO (Khan, 1990). During Bogra's tenure, which extended until 1955, the diplomatic underpinnings of Pakistan's foreign policy remained consistent, despite shifts in governmental leadership. When Ch. Muhammad Ali assumed the role of Prime Minister, the continuity in foreign policy was largely attributed to the prevailing political instability and the subsequent dissolution of his government on 12 September 1956. Suharwardy demonstrates his toward the Western Block. Malik Feroz Khan Noon was sent to the Security Council to present a resolution regarding the Kashmir issues. The U.S. Britain and Cuba tabled a resolution demanding the implementation of the U.N.'s promise to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir. The resolution was vetoed by Russia. In the wake of Soharwardi's resignation, Iskandar Mirza invited a Muslim League leader I.I. Chundrighar to form the new government. Following the resignation of Chundrighar, Iskandar Mirza decided to hand over power to Malik Feroz

Khan Noon to form the cabinet. During this period foreign policies passed through a critical phase. The changes in the system ended with the resignation of Iskandar Mirza on 7 October 1958. (Ahmad, 1973), Ayub Khan consolidated presidential powers, instituting a presidential form of government. However, challenges arose, notably Turkey's lack of acceptance in Gulf States due to its recognition of Israel, and Egypt's condemnation of the pact, despite being regarded by the British as a key security state in the Middle East. (Abdul Sattar, 2015), The Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 unfolded against the backdrop of heightened tensions between Egypt and Britain. Egypt's President, Jamal Abdel Nasser, made a surprising announcement in July 1956 regarding the nationalization of the Suez Canal Corporation, prompted in part by the United States' decision to withdraw support for the construction of the Aswan Dam. The strategic significance of the Suez Canal, both economically and geopolitically, drew considerable attention from Western powers, particularly Britain and France. Profits from the Suez Canal were probably delivering another cause of assets. (Burke, 1955), This decision irritated to British and France who possessed the Suez Canal Company. It was worrying for the U.S. and Western states. However, misguided in recollection they imagined that Egypt's complete control of the marine highway would expose their main trade benefits. Possibly so that no more than a reasoning. Ceylon Indians and Indonesians were too, influenced by on Egyptian Suez Canal for trade so they predicted the party-political root of the dispute. During his official visit to the U.S. in July 1957, Pakistan's Prime Minister Suhrawardy informed President Eisenhower about Pakistan's agreement to establish a top-secret U.S. base at Badaber near Peshawar, allowing U.S. jets to utilize the Pakistani airbase. President Ayub Khan affirmed that this decision was made in consideration of Pakistan's security requirements and its need for

economic and military aid. Additionally, the Pakistani government expressed concerns regarding the timely transfer of B57 bombers. (Stephens, 1967). In the wake of the China-Baharat border conflict, America completely neglected ties with old ally Pakistan and began patronizing India. America had since long been desirous of joining hands with India whereas India on its part, wanted to get the maximum benefit from the US while projecting itself as a neutral country.

The Evolving International Landscape: U.S.-Pakistan Relations in the 1960s

In the 1960s, the international situation was taking a new turn. In May 1960, a U.S. U2 spy plane was shot down by the Russians. It was taken off from Pakistan's city of Peshawar. This event had major repercussions including the cancellation of an impending Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit meeting. In 1962 October, the Cuban Missile Crisis led the U.S. and the USSR toward a situation that could change the Cold War into a hot war. But after this, both the countries realized the concentration of the opposition and were frustrated to succeed in rapprochement to reduce the pending risk of war. Hence, the US desired to make terms with the USSR. In the realm of international relations, Pakistan found itself navigating a delicate balance between the costs associated with strengthening alliances and the imperative of maintaining a nuanced and restrained foreign policy approach. Pakistan's aggressive attempts to strengthen its affiliation with the United States were signaled by the ratification of a new defense pact in April 1959, which strengthened this commitment. To protect its interests, Pakistan aimed to lessen India's influence over American policy choices by siding with the United States. President Eisenhower attempted to allay Nehru's worries by promising that weaponry sent to Pakistan would not be used against India, despite the United States' constant overtures towards India. This signaled a more nuanced approach to the dynamics of regional security. The India-

Pakistan War of 1965 was a significant conflict between the two neighboring countries, primarily over the Kashmir region. The division of British India in 1947, which resulted in the establishment of India and Pakistan, is the source of the war. The majority-Muslim territory of Kashmir, which was under the Hindu Maharaja's control, became a sensitive point of contention between the two recently constituted countries. Global powers, particularly the US and the Soviet Union, were paying closely to both nations' conduct as they sought to get the upper hand in the fight. Under President Lyndon B. Johnson, the US tried to mediate the dispute and stop it from getting worse. The Johnson administration was concerned that an extended battle between Pakistan and India would cause instability in the area and could spark a larger conflict between the US and USSR, the two Cold War superpowers. (McMahon), The US, the UK, and the USSR attempted to exert pressure on India and Pakistan to accept a cease-fire. After a truce was eventually mediated via diplomatic channels, the Tashkent Agreement was signed on September 23, 1965, bringing an end to the conflict. However, the underlying issues between India and Pakistan, particularly regarding Kashmir, remained unresolved, leading to further conflicts and tensions in the subsequent decades.

US-Pakistan Relations and Regional Dynamics during the 1970s

The dismemberment of East Pakistan in 1971 marked a significant chapter in the history of Pakistan, leading to the creation of Bangladesh. East Pakistan eventually separated from the rest of the country due to a variety of circumstances that contributed to the complicated and dynamic events that took place during this time. The extreme economic divide between East and West Pakistan was one of the main causes of the severing. Despite having a larger population than West Pakistan, East Pakistan felt economically inferior to its more affluent neighbor. In the 1970 general

elections, the Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, won by a wide margin, gaining a majority of seats in the National Assembly. There were several protests and turmoil in East Pakistan because of the governing elite in West Pakistan's reluctance to cede control to the Awami League. Despite having strong diplomatic connections and offering Pakistan financial and military support, the United States took a rather passive approach to the East Pakistani dispute. (Williams, 1972), Critics claim that during the battle, the United States did little to stop the Pakistani military from abusing human rights and carrying out crimes against the people of East Pakistan. Others contend that the United States was more concerned with advancing its geopolitical objectives in the area, especially given its alliance with Pakistan during the Cold War as a counterweight to communism. (Shah, 2002), In summary, the 1971 division of East Pakistan was a terrible and complicated event with ramifications for the whole area. The United States' reaction to the crisis and its consequences for human rights and international affairs is still up for dispute, even though several issues, including political grievances and economic inequality, led to the split. In his dealings with the United States, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto combined pragmatism, aggressiveness, and a desire for strategic autonomy. During the 1970s, Bhutto held the positions of President and Prime Minister of Pakistan. The Cold War competition between the US and the USSR had moulded the difficult international environment that she inherited. Reducing Pakistan's reliance on the US and diversifying its foreign policy was one of Bhutto's main goals. Bhutto worked to foster deeper links with other nations, especially those in the Islamic world and the Non-Aligned Movement, even as he kept diplomatic ties with Washington. Simultaneously, Bhutto advocated for a strong nationalist stance, especially during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War that resulted in East Pakistan's secession and

the establishment of Bangladesh. Bhutto acknowledged the value of keeping a cooperative relationship with Washington, especially in the areas of military support and economic aid, notwithstanding his disapproval of American policy. (Zaheer, 2008) The United States continued to provide Pakistan with military and economic support during his administration, despite occasional strains and differences over topics like human rights and the spread of nuclear weapons. In Pakistan at the turbulent beginning of the 1970s, Bhutto became a well-known figure at the top of the political hierarchy. Mr. Bhutto, who obtained his political mandate from the 1970 Pakistani elections, saw the nuclear bomb as a possible means of achieving national liberation, especially after Pakistan suffered severe military defeats in the events of 1971. The Communist power also possesses it. Only the Islamic civilization was without it, but that position was about to change." (Baud, 2004), After making this claim, Pakistan faced several obstacles on its path as a nation, such as the important Shimla Agreement with India in 1972 and India's nuclear tests in 1974. Furthermore, the "Two Nations Theory," which held that the Muslims of the subcontinent comprised a single country, suffered a severe blow with the creation of Bangladesh, a Muslim-majority nation forged out of ethnic and linguistic identity. There was a significant blow to the idea that religious uniformity might lead to political unification. (Ahmed M. I.), A deeper look at this last testimony reveals some fascinating information. Two overt agreements were signed by Prime Minister Bhutto and an extraordinary military-scientific team she led to Beijing in May 1976. No information about the secret procedures involved has been made public to date. The proverb that "dying men don't tell lies" suggests that Bhutto's reference to an agreement signed in 1976 implies its profound importance for the welfare and survival of the Pakistani populace. (Graver, 2011), During his time as Pakistan's President

and Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto brought about a dramatic change in the country's foreign policy, especially about China and the United States. Bhutto was instrumental in making possible US President Richard Nixon's historic visit to China in 1971, which opened the door for the two countries to normalize ties. Pakistan was also able to reduce its dependency on US military and economic assistance because of its alignment with China. (Andrew Small, 2015), Still, Bhutto did not have an entirely estranged foreign policy from the United States. He attempted to broaden Pakistan's foreign alliances. He nevertheless kept diplomatic ties with the US and asked for US support in several areas, including military aid. Bhutto's overall foreign policy toward the US and China was to strengthen Pakistan's strategic standing in South Asia and lessen its susceptibility to outside influences, especially those emanating from India.

Conclusion

Summing up the discussion above, it appears that Pakistan owing to deal with its economic vulnerability, political instability within the country, and counter threats of aggression from India and USSR had to shed off its non-aligned posture and join the SEATO and CENTO agreement. The US despite having failed to provide armed assistance to Pakistan in its wars with India in 1965 and 1971 kept engaged with Pakistan diplomatically and by offering economic assistance. Although Pakistan being betrayed by the USA attempted to stay at a distance, security and economic needs halted it from adopting such a policy for longer. The USA though always provided Pakistan economic and military assistance against the USSR, but it remained ever reluctant to do so against India because of its economic and demographic strength. However, WE couldn't become disengaged with Pakistan, as the latter's geostrategic importance had always been lucrative for the US for pursuing its interest in the region and tackling with countries said to

be its ideological counterparts, i.e. China and USSR.

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